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Secret key agreement for hypergraphical sources
with limited total discussion
Chung Chan
Abstract—This work considers the problem of multiterminal
secret key agreement by limited total public discussion under the
hypergraphical source model. The secrecy capacity as a function
of the total discussion rate is completely characterized by a
polynomial-time computable linear program. Compared to the
existing solution for a particular hypergraphical source model
called the pairwise independent network (PIN) model, the current
result is a non-trivial extension as it applies to a strictly larger
class of sources and a more general scenario involving helpers and
wiretapper’s side information. In particular, while the existing
solution by tree-packing can be strictly suboptimal for the PIN
model with helpers and the hypergraphical source model in
general, we can show that decremental secret key agreement and
linear network coding is optimal, resolving a previous conjecture
in the affirmative. The converse is established by a single-letter
upper bound on the secrecy capacity for discrete memoryless
multiple sources and individual discussion rate constraints. The
minimax optimization involved in the bound can be relaxed to
give the best existing upper bounds on secrecy capacities such
as the lamination bounds for hypergraphical sources, helper-
set bound for general sources, the bound at asymptotically
zero discussion rate via the multivariate Ga´c–Ko¨rner common
information, and the lower bound on communication complexity
via a multivariate extension of the Wyner common information.
These reductions unify existing bounding techniques and reveal
surprising connections between seemingly different information-
theoretic notions. Further challenges are posed in this work along
with a simple example of finite linear source where the current
converse techniques fail even though the proposed achieving
scheme remains optimal.
Index Terms—Multiterminal secret key agreement; con-
strained secrecy capacity; hypergraphical sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key agreement by public discussion
was formulated by [1, 2] where two users with correlated
private observations discuss in public at unlimited rate to
agree on a common secret key. The key has to be secured
from a wiretapper who listens to the entire public discussion
and observes some side information correlated with the users’
private observations. The fact that public discussion helps
generate more secret key bits was discovered in [3]. A natural
question is: What is the maximum secret key rate, called the
secrecy capacity, achievable by a given public discussion rate?
Equivalently, what is the minimum discussion rate, called the
communication complexity, required to achieve a given secret
key rate? Rate-limited public discussion was first considered in
[4], which also introduced a helper who can help generate the
secret key but needs not recover it. [5] extended the problem
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to the multiterminal case involving arbitrary numbers of users
and helpers, who can be trusted or untrusted.
The secrecy capacity or communication complexity is, in
general, unknown except in some special cases. For the two-
user case, the capacity was characterized in [1] with unlimited
one-way public discussion. With two-way interactive discus-
sion but no wiretapper’s side information, the capacity reduces
to Shannon’s mutual of the user’s private observations [1, 2].
If, in addition, that the number of rounds of interactive
discussion is limited, the communication complexity that
achieves the largest possible secrecy capacity was given by
[6]. Subsequently, the secrecy capacity as a function of the
individual discussion rates of the two users was derived in
[7]. If the number of rounds is unlimited, however, these
characterizations are not considered single-letter solutions as
they involve optimizations over an unbounded number of
auxiliary random variables, which are incomputable.
Despite the difficulty in getting a single-letter character-
ization of the secrecy capacity in the two-user case, the
multiterminal case has been considered and resolved partially.
For instance, [8, 9] characterized the capacity for the case
with no discussion or at asymptotically 0 discussion rate.
In the other extreme where the discussion is unlimited, the
secrecy capacity was characterized in [5] when there is no
wiretapper’s side information. The capacity as a function of
the total discussion rate was characterized in [10] for the case
without helpers and for a graphical source model called the
pairwise independent network (PIN) model proposed in [11].
The capacity as a function of individual discussion rate is also
characterized in [12] for the tree PIN model, and in [13, 14] for
minimally connected hypergraphical sources. Other than the
above cases, there are various bounds on the secrecy capacity
and communication complexity [12, 15–21] for general and
special source models, but exact characterizations remain
unknown.
In particular, there appears no direct extension of existing
solutions to cover the PIN model with helpers and hypergraph-
ical sources that are not necessarily minimally connected. The
achieving scheme for PIN model without helpers in [10, 12]
used the tree-packing scheme of [11, 22], which is strictly
suboptimal in achieving the secrecy capacity, even in the case
with unlimited public discussion. The solution for minimally
connected hypergraphical sources in [13, 14] was derived
using a bound in [12] that can be loose when the PIN model
has cycles.
The focus of this work is primarily on the multiterminal
setting with an arbitrary number of users and helpers. The
goal is to unify different bounding techniques in existing
2works and improve them to give exact single-letter capacity
characterizations for a larger class of source models beyond
the PIN and minimally connected hypergraphical sources. In
particular, decremental secret key agreement was conjectured
to be optimal for hypergraphical sources [12, 17]. The conjec-
ture can be further generalized to the optimality of compressed
secret key agreement for finite linear sources [21]. With the
same linearity arguments as in [20], the conjecture implies the
optimality of the linear network coding scheme [23–27] and
that private randomization is not needed.
In this work, we have unified and improved existing bound-
ing techniques to show that decremental secret key agree-
ment is optimal for hypergraphical source. Furthermore, the
secrecy capacity can communication complexity for hyper-
graphical sources are characterized by linear programs that
are polynomial-time computable. For finite linear sources,
the conjecture remains unsolved, but we give an example to
illustrate the limitation of the converse result and the potential
improvement. We remark that [28] also characterized the com-
munication complexity for hypergraphical sources but under
the assumption that the discussion is linear. Furthermore, [28]
considered a one-shot model where the communication com-
plexity was shown to be NP-hard to compute. In contrast, we
consider an asymptotic model without assuming the discussion
is linear and obtained polynomial-time computable character-
izations. We also remark that there is a duality between the
secret key agreement problem and the problem of generating
maximum common randomness (distributed simulation) [23,
Theorem 2.3]. Hence, the results for secret key agreement can
translate to the results for maximum common randomness and
vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. We formulate the secret
key agreement problem for general sources and hypergraphic
sources in Section II. Section II gives the main results,
namely an improved converse for general sources and its
reduction to the exact linear programming characterizations for
hypergraphical sources. Section IV explains how the converse
reduces to various existing bounds on secrecy capacity and
communication complexity. Section V gives an example of a
finite linear source for which the converse is loose. The proofs
are given in the appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement problem
formulated in [5] for a multiterminal discrete memoryless
source
ZV := (Zi | i ∈ V ) and Z˜
distributed according to a given joint distribution P
ZV Z˜
over
a possibly unbounded support set ZV × Z˜ . V is a finite set
of users, Zi is the private source of user i ∈ V , and Z˜ is the
wiretapper’s side information.
For secret key agreement, every user i ∈ V observes an n
i.i.d. sequence Zni := (Zi1, . . . ,Zin) and generates a private
and possibly continuous random variable Ui independent of
the source, i.e.,
PUV |ZnV =
∏
i∈V
PUi . (1)
Then, the users engage in an interactive public discussion
where some user ij ∈ V at round j ∈ {1, . . . , r} of the
discussion reveals in public a finitely valued message
F˜j := f˜j(Uij ,Z
n
ij
, F˜j−1), (2a)
namely a deterministic function of the accumulated knowledge
of user ij , which includes the private randomization Uij ,
source Znij , and all the previous discussion F˜
j−1. For notational
simplicity, we define
Fi := (F˜j | j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, ij = i)
F := FV ,
(2b)
(2c)
namely the entire discussion by user i and by all users
respectively.
After the public discussion, a subset A ⊆ V of the
users, called the active users, wants to agree on a secret
key K secured against a wiretapper observing Z˜n, the entire
discussion F, and the source ZnD of a subset D ⊆ V \ A of
users called the untrusted helpers. (V \ A is called the set
of helpers, where V \ A \ D is the set of trusted helpers.)
More precisely, a sequence in n of UV , F and K is a secret
key agreement scheme if there exist decoding functions φi for
i ∈ A such that
lim
n→∞
Pr{K = φi(Ui,Z
n
i ,F) ∀i ∈ A} = 1
lim
n→∞
log|K| −H(K|F,ZnD, Z˜
n) = 0,
(3)
(4)
where K denotes a finite set of possible secret key values.
The prior condition (3) is called the recoverability constraint
and the latter one (4) is called the secrecy (and uniformity)
constraint.
A secret key rate rK ∈ R+ is said to be achievable by the
public discussion rates rV := (ri | i ∈ V ) ∈ R
V
+ if and only if
there exists a secret key agreement scheme (K,F) satisfying
the above conditions (3) and (4), and the rate constraints
rK ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K|
ri ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|Fi| ∀i ∈ V,
(5a)
(5b)
where Fi denotes the set of possible messages by user i.
Denotes the set of achievable rate tuple (rK, rV ) by
RV,A,D[ZV ‖Z˜]. The secrecy capacity is the maximum achiev-
able key rate denoted by
CV,A,DS [ZV ‖Z˜](rV ) := sup{rK ∈ R+ |
(rK, rV ) ∈ R
V,A,D[ZV ‖Z˜]},
CV,A,DS [ZV ‖Z˜](R) := sup{rK ∈ R+ |
(rK, rV ) ∈ R
V,A,D[ZV ‖Z˜], r(V ) ≤ R},
(6)
(7)
for rV ∈ RV+ and R ∈ R+, where, for notational convenience,
we define for B ⊆ V
r(B) :=
∑
i∈B
ri.
3It is easy to see that the secrecy capacity is non-decreasing
in the discussion rates. The communication complexity as a
function of the key rate rK is defined as
RV,A,DS [ZV ‖Z˜](rK) := inf{R ∈ R+ |
CV,A,DS [ZV ‖Z˜](R) = C
V,A,D
S [ZV ‖Z˜](∞)},
(8)
which is simply the inverse of CV,A,DS [ZV ‖Z˜](R). In the rest
of the paper, we will omit the dependency on V,A,D,ZV , Z˜
and write
R, CS(rV ), CS(R), RS(rK)
for the case without untrusted helper (D = ∅) nor wiretapper’s
side information (Z˜ = 0) unless otherwise specified. We will
also write
CS = lim inf
R→∞
CS(R)
RS = lim sup
rK→CS
RS(rK)
(9)
(10)
respectively for the unconstrained secrecy capacity with un-
bounded discussion rate, and the communication complexity
to attain the unconstrained the secrecy capacity.
Consider a hypergraph (V,E, ξ) with vertex set V , edge set
E and the edge function ξ : E → 2V \{∅}, where ξ(e) denotes
the set of vertices incident on an edge e ∈ E. A hypergraphical
source is defined with respect to such a hypergraph as [23, 29]
Zi = (Xe | i ∈ ξ(e)) for i ∈ V (11a)
where XE := (Xe | e ∈ E) is a given random vector
and Xe’s are independent random variables called the edge
(random) variables with bounded supports. In other words,
each user gets to observe a subset of the independent edge
variables. The model covers the pairwise independent network
(PIN) model [11, 22] as a special case when exactly two
users observe each edge variable, i.e., |ξ(e)| = 2, and so the
hypergraph reduces to a graph. One may also consider a hy-
pergraphical source model with wiretapper’s side information,
where
Z˜ = XE˜ (11b)
for some given subset E˜ ⊆ E.
III. MAIN RESULTS
All the converse results in this paper are based on the
following single-letter upper bound on the secrecy capacity.
The bound applies to general sources and allows for trusted
helpers, i.e., with D = ∅ but V \A possibly non-empty.
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity (6) as a function of discus-
sion rate rV ∈ RV is upper bounded as follows:
CS(rV ) ≤ sup
W,r′V
I(W ∧ ZV )− r
′(V )
= sup
W
min
λ∈Λ¯
I(W ∧ ZV )− r(V )
−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)
[
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)− r(B)
]
,
(12a)
(12b)
where
• the maximization in the first expression (12a) is over
the choices of an auxiliary random variable W (or its
distribution PW|ZV more specifically) and a real vector
r′V ∈ R
V subject to the constraints
r′(B) ≥ I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ∀B 6⊇ A
r′i ≤ ri ∀i ∈ V ;
(13a)
(13b)
• the minimization in the second expression (12b) is over
the choice of a set function λ : {B ⊆ V | B 6⊇ A} → R+
satisfying ∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
λ(B) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ V. (14)
λ is referred to as a fractional cover and we denote the
set of all such fractional covers by Λ¯. ✷
PROOF See Appendix A. 
An important simplification is to consider the total discus-
sion rate constraint instead of the individual rates. The above
bound translates directly to the following bound on the secrecy
capacity for a given total discussion rate.
Corollary 1 The secrecy capacity (7) for R ≥ 0 are upper
bounded as follows:
CS(R) ≤ sup{I(W ∧ ZV )− r(V ) | r(V ) ≤ R,
r(B) ≥ I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ∀B 6⊇ A}
= sup
W:ρ(W)≤R
I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W)
(15a)
(15b)
CS ≤ min
λ∈Λ
Iλ(ZV ), (16)
where
ρ(W) := max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)
Iλ(ZV ) := H(ZV )−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)H(ZB |ZV \B)
(17)
(18)
and Λ denotes the set of fractional partitions λ : {B ⊆
V | B 6⊇ A} → R+, which are fractional covers with the
constraint (14) satisfied with equality, i.e.,∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
λ(B) = 1 ∀i ∈ V. (19)
The corresponding lower bound on the communication com-
plexity (8),
RS(rK) ≥ inf
W:I(W∧ZV )−ρ(W)≥rK
I(W ∧ ZV )− rK (20)
for any given secret key rate rK ≥ 0. ✷
PROOF See Appendix B. 
Note that the above bounds involve an auxiliary random
variable W, an optimal solution of which exists by standard
support lemma [30] if the support of the random source is
finite. It is also straightforward to argue that the upper bounds
on the secrecy capacity are non-decreasing, concave, and
continuous in the discussion rates. The two expressions ((12a)
4and (12b)) for the upper bound (12) are related by the linear
programming duality [31], where the minimization over λ is
the dual of the maximization over r′V . λ(B) is the Lagrangian
multiplier for the constraints on r′V in (13).
It is instructive to compare r′V to the feasible rate of
communication for omniscience [5] in
RCO = {rV ∈ R
V |
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \B) ∀B ⊆ V : B 6⊇ A}.
(21a)
(21b)
The above corresponds to the set of public discussion rate tuple
such that each user can recover the entire source ZV after
the discussion, i.e., attain omniscience. Suppose the source
ZV has finite support. Then, the region must be non-empty.
The constraints in (13a) play a similar role as the Slepian-
Wolf constraints in (21b) above. In particular, the two sets
of constraints are the same if W = ZV and r
′
i = ri.
This connection can be observed similarly in the bounds for
total discussion rate instead of individual discussion rate. In
particular, with W = ZV , ρ(W) defined in (17) becomes the
smallest rate of communication for omniscience [5]
RCO = min
rV ∈RCO
r(V )
= max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)H(ZB |ZV \B)
(22a)
(22b)
where the last equality is again by the linear programming
duality. With ρ(W) = RCO and assuming ZV has finite
support, the bound (15b) on secrecy capacity becomes (16),
which is the unconstrained secrecy capacity characterized in
[5] as
CS = H(ZV )−RCO
= min
λ∈Λ
Iλ(ZV ),
(23a)
(23b)
where Iλ is the information measure defined in (18). The last
equality means that the bound (16) is tight when ZV has finite
support. The expression is non-negative as expected because
by the Shearer Lemma (see [32, Lemma D.1] or [23, 33])
Iλ(ZV ) ≥ 0 (24)
with equality if Zi’s are mutually independent. In the case
without helpers, i.e., A = V , (23b) can be further simplified
to the following multivariate mutual information as shown in
[29, 34, 35]:
I(ZV ) = min
P∈Π′(V )
1
|P|
D(PZV ‖
∏
C∈P
PZC )
:= inf{γ ∈ R|∀P ∈ Π′(V ),
H(ZV )− γ =
∑
C∈P
H(ZC)− γ}
(25a)
(25b)
where Π′(V ) is the set of partitions of V into at least two
non-empty disjoint sets. The first expression (25a) was given
as an upper bound on CS in [5]. It can be obtained from (18)
with
λ(B) =
{
1
|P|−1 , V \B ∈ P
0, otherwise.
(26)
for any partition P of V . The constraint in the second
expression (25b) is the constrained residual independence
relation given in [35, 36], which means that I(ZV ) is the
smallest amount of shared information removal of which leads
to independence.
The bounds on the secrecy capacity and communication
complexity can be shown to be tight for the hypergraphical
sources as follows:
Theorem 2 For hypergraphical sources defined in (11a), the
secrecy capacity (7) and communication complexity (8) are
equal to the upper bound (15b) and lower bound (20) respec-
tively, which can be simplified further by setting
W = (QE ,X
′
E) where
X′e =
{
X Qe = 1
0 Qe = 0
for e ∈ E
(27a)
(27b)
and Qe’s are independent bits independent of the source with
distribution
PQE |ZV︷ ︸︸ ︷
PQE |XE =
∏
e∈E
PQe︷ ︸︸ ︷
Bern
(
xe
H(Xe)
)
(27c)
for some vector xV ∈ RV . ✷
PROOF See Appendix C. 
Corollary 2 For hypergraphical sources, R, rK ≥ 0,
CS(R) = max{x(E)− r(V )|r(V ) ≤ R
r(B) ≥ x(E(B)) ∀B ⊆ V : B 6⊇ A
0 ≤ xe ≤ H(Xe) ∀e ∈ E}
= max{x(E)− ρ|ρ ≤ R
ρ = max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B))
0 ≤ xe ≤ H(Xe) ∀e ∈ E}
(28a)
(28b)
RS(rK) = min{x(E)− rK |
0 ≤ xe ≤ H(Xe) ∀e ∈ E
x(E) −
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B)) ≥ rK


(29)
where we define x(E′) :=
∑
e∈E′ xe for E
′ ⊆ E as usual and
E(B) := {e ∈ E | ξ(e) ⊆ B} for B ⊆ V, (30)
namely, the set of edges that are incident only on nodes within
B. The linear programs above can be solved in polynomial-
time. ✷
PROOF See Appendix D. 
The theorem is proved by showing that the bounds (15b)
and (20) on the secrecy capacity can be achieved by the
decremental secret key agreement scheme in [16, 37]. The
linear programs in the corollary are obtained by evaluating
the bounds (15b) and (20) explicitly with the optimal solution
choice of the auxiliary random variable W in (27).
5The idea of decremental secret key agreement is to reduce
the randomness of the source ZV by eliminating some random-
ness of each edge variable, leading to a reduced source Z′V , and
then generate the secret key via omniscience of the reduced
source, i.e., achieving the unconstrained secrecy capacity of
Z′V . More formally, the reduced source is
Z′i := (X
′
e | i ∈ ξ(e)) for i ∈ V (31)
where X′e and Qe are as defined in (27) for some vector
xV ∈ RV . Each user i ∈ V can privately reduce their source
Zi effectively to Z
′
i by keeping only the first
xe
H(Xe)
fraction
of the n i.i.d. samples of Xe for each edge e ∈ E with
i ∈ ξ(e). An immediate generalization of decremental secret
key agreement to general sources beyond hypergraphic sources
is the compressed secret key agreement in [21], where the
reduced source Z′i can be chosen as arbitrary processing of Zi
with a time sharing variable Q, i.e.,
H(Z′i|Zi,Q) = 0
PQ|ZV = PQ.
(32)
(33)
The secret key rate CS[Z
′
V |Q] is therefore achievable by a dis-
cussion of rate RCO[Z
′
V |Q], where, similar to the conditional
entropy H(Z′V |Q), CS and RCO evaluated at Z
′
V |Q means
conditioning on Q, i.e., with distribution PZ′
V
|Q(·|Q) as the
source, and then take expectations with respect to Q.
The optimality of decremental secret key agreement re-
solved the conjecture in [17] that decremental secret key
agreement is optimal and also the conjecture in [10] that linear
network coding (discussion) is optimal. The idea of secret key
agreement by linear network coding can be found in [24–
27, 38, 39]. A straightforward extension of the results to the
case with untrusted helpers and wiretapper’s side information
is as follows:
Proposition 1 In the case with untrusted helpers (D 6= ∅) and
wiretapper’s side information (11b), we have
CV,A,DS [ZV ‖W](R) = C
V \D,A,∅
S [Z
′
V \D‖0](R) where (34)
Z′i := (Xe | e ∈ E \ E˜,
i ∈ ξ(e), D ∩ ξ(e) = ∅) for i ∈ V \D,
(35)
(36)
which is obtained from Zi by removing the edge variables
observed by the untrusted helpers and wiretappers. ✷
PROOF Note that ≥ for (34) holds because Z′i can be obtained
from Zi for i ∈ V , and Z′V \D is independent of ()ZD, Z˜). To
explain the reverse inequality, note that the capacity does not
decrease by turning the wiretapper into an untrusted helper,
i.e.,
CV,A,DS [ZV ‖W](R) ≤ C
V ∪{0},A,D∪{0}
S [ZV ∪{0}](R)
with Z0 = Z˜, assuming 0 6∈ V without loss of generality.
The upper bound above can be further upper bounded by the
R.H.S. of (34) as desired because PYV \D = PZV |ZD,Z˜ by the
independence of edge variables. 
IV. REDUCTION TO VARIOUS CONVERSE RESULTS
In this section, we will show that the bounds in Theorem 1
and Corollary 1 unify various exiting converse results. First
of all, by the result of [5] that the upper bound (16) on CS
can be achieved via communication for omniscience at the
smallest rate, it is straightforward to show that, for any smallest
omniscience rate tuple rV ∈ RCO : r(V ) = RCO and sum
rate R ≥ RCO, the upper bounds (12), (15b), and (16) are
tight, equal to the unconstrained secrecy capacity given by
(23). Furthermore, W = ZV is optimal to the maximizations
in the upper bounds (12) and (15b). Indeed, if W = ZV is also
optimal to the minimization in the lower bound (20), then the
lower bound is also tight:
Proposition 2 For ZV with finite support, RS = RCO, i.e.,
the communication for omniscience scheme in [5] for secret
key agreement achieves RS, if W = ZV is an optimal solution
to the minimization in the lower bound (20) on the commu-
nication complexity for some rK ∈ [0, CS]. In particular, this
holds if ZV has finite support and
min
W:Iλ(ZV |W)=0,∀λ∈Λ∗
I(W ∧ ZV ) = H(ZV ) (37)
where Λ∗ is the set of optimal solutions λ to (16). ✷
PROOF Suppose W = ZV is optimal to (20). Then, (20)
becomes
RS(rK) ≥ H(ZV )− rK
≥ H(ZV )−min
λ∈Λ
Iλ(ZV ) by (16)
= RCO by (23b).
Equality holds as desired since RS ≤ RCO by the omniscience
scheme for secret key agreement in [5].
Next, we show that (37) implies W = ZV is optimal to (20)
with rK = CS as follows. By (20)
RS(CS) ≥ inf
W:I(W∧ZV )−ρ(W)≥CS
I(W ∧ ZV )− CS
(a)
= inf
W:minλ∈Λ[Iλ(ZV )−Iλ(ZV |W)]≥minλ∈Λ Iλ(ZV )
I(W ∧ ZV )− CS
(b)
≥ inf
W:Iλ(ZV |W)=0,∀λ∈Λ∗
I(W ∧ ZV )− CS.
(a) is obtained by rewriting the constraint by (65) and
CS(R) = minλ∈Λ Iλ(ZV ) by (23), which in turn holds as
RCO <∞ for ZV with finite support. (b) is because, for any
λ ∈ Λ∗, the constraint implies that
Iλ(ZV )− Iλ(ZV |W) ≥ Iλ(ZV ), or equivalently
Iλ(ZV |W) = 0.
Finally, if (37) holds, we have
RS(CS) ≥ H(ZV )− CS = RCO
as desired by (23). 
The above result covers the sufficient condition in [19, 32].
More precisely, the sufficient condition in [32] is in terms of
6the multivariate Wyner common information defined below for
a fractional partition λ as
CW,λ(ZV ) := inf
W
I(W ∧ ZV ) such that
Iλ(ZV |W) = 0.
(38)
(39)
(37) can be rewritten as CW,λ(ZV ) = H(ZV ), which is the
sufficient condition in [32] with helpers.
In the other extreme where the discussion rate has to be 0,
the upper bounds on the secrecy capacity are also tight, which
cover the result in [9] with helpers.
Proposition 3 With r′V = 0 and R = 0, the secrecy capacity
upper bounds (12) and (15b) are tight and simplifies to the
Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information
JGK(ZA) := max{H(G)||G| <∞,
H(G|Zi) = 0 ∀i ∈ A}.
(40a)
(40b)
Furthermore, the optimal solution G, called the maximal
common function of Zi for i ∈ A, is an optimal solution
for W in (12) and (15b). ✷
PROOF With rV = 0, (13a) and (13b) implies that a feasible
W must satisfy
0 = I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ∀B ⊆ V : B 6⊇ A
= I(W ∧ ZV \{i}|Zi) ∀i ∈ A
where the last equality is obtained by setting B = V \{i}. By
the double Markov inequality [40, Problem 16.25],
I(W ∧ ZV |G) = 0
for the optimal solution G to (40). It follows that
I(W ∧ ZV ) ≤ I(W,G ∧ ZV )
= I(G ∧ ZV ) +H(W ∧ ZV |G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= H(G),
which implies by (12a) that
CS(rV ) ≤ H(G) = JGK(ZA).
Equality holds as desired as we can use the entire randomness
of G for the secret key without any discussion. More precisely,
by [5, Lemma B.1], a key rate of H(G) − r(V ) = H(G) is
achievable. 
The constraint (40a) requires G to have finite support. If we
set W = G, then ρ(W) = 0 in (17) by the constraint (40b)
that G is a function of Zi for any i ∈ A, and hence the name
common function. The secrecy capacity upper bound (15b)
then becomes H(G) = JGK(ZA). The bound is achievable
intuitively because G is a common function of the active users
and so, even with no discussion, a common secret key can be
extracted from G at rate H(G).
Other than the two extreme cases with unlimited or 0
discussion rate, the secrecy capacity upper bound (12) strictly
improves the existing bounds for multiterminal secret key
agreement. In particular, it implies the following result that
not only covers the bound in [12, Theorem 4.1] for general
sources but also extends it to the case with helpers.
Proposition 4 We have CS(rV ) ≥ rK only if
r(S) ≥
1∑
B∈H λ
′(B)− 1
[
rK − Iλ′(ZV \S)
]
(41)
For all S ⊆ V : |A \ S| ≥ 2 and λ′ : {B ⊆ V \ S : B 6⊇
A \ S} → R+ satisfying∑
B 6⊇A\S
λ′(B) = 1, (42)
i.e., λ′ is a fractional partition of V \ S. ✷
PROOF See Appendix E 
It is instructive to consider the condition on rK where the
bound becomes trivial for a given choice of S, i.e., r(S) ≥ 0.
Since the factor 1∑
B∈H λ
′(B)−1 is strictly positive, the bound
is trivial only if
rK ≤ min
λ′
Iλ′ (ZV \S).
The condition is rather intuitive because, by (23b), the expres-
sion on the right is the unconstrained secrecy capacity when S
is removed or not allowed to discuss. (41) is called the helper-
set bound because it gives how much discussion (help) users
in S need so that users in V \ S can share a key at a rate
beyond their capacity.
Although the bound (41) looks quite different from the orig-
inal bound (12b), it can be derived directly from the original
bound by exchanging the maximization and minimization and
then restricting the set of possible λ appropriately. The bound
in [12, Theorem 4.1] for the case without helpers, i.e., A = V ,
can be obtained from (41) with
λ′(B) =
{
1
|P|−1 , V \B ∈ P
0, otherwise.
(43)
for any partition P of V \ S.
For hypergraphical sources, since the characterizations of
the secrecy capacity in (11) is tight, it covers the lamination
bounds in [10]. The following result unifies the lamination
bounds:
Proposition 5 For hypergraphical sources and R ≥ 0,
0 ≤ CS(R)−H(XE\E′) ≤
(
1
maxλ∈Λ α(λ)
− 1
)
R (44)
where
E′ := {e ∈ E|ξ(e) 6⊇ A}
α(λ) :=


min
e∈E′
∑
B 6⊇A:ξ(e)⊆B
λ(B), H(XE′) 6= 0
1, otherwise.
(45)
(46)
Equality holds if R ≤ mine∈E′ H(Xe). ✷
PROOF See Appendix F. 
Note that the upper bound is linear in R, and the slope can
be bounded as follows.
7Proposition 6 For hypergraphical sources, the slope of R in
the upper bound (44) can be bounded as follows:
0 ≤
1
maxλ∈Λ α(λ)
− 1 ≤
min{d, |A|} − 1
max{|A| − d, 1}
where
d := max
e∈E′
|ξ(e)|
(47)
(48)
denotes the maximum degree of the edges in E′. Furthermore,
the bounds in (47) can be achieved with equality for some
hypergraphs. ✷
PROOF See Appendix G. 
To reduce the upper in (44) to the EP bound in [10], consider
as in [10] the case A = V , H(XE′) 6= 0 and H(XE\E′) = 0.
Let
λP (B) =
{
1
|P|−1 V \B ∈ P
0 otherwise
for any partition P of V with |P| > 1. Then,
α(λP ) = min
e∈E′
∑
B 6⊇A:ξ(e)⊆B
λP(B)
=
1
|P| − 1
min
e∈E′
|{V \B ∈ P|ξ(e) ⊆ B}|
=
1
|P| − 1
min
e∈E′
[|P| − |{C ∈ P|ξ(e) ∩ C 6= ∅}|]
= 1−
maxe∈E′ |{C ∈ P|ξ(e) ∩ C 6= ∅}|
|P| − 1
.
Substituting the above into (44) gives the EP bound [10,
Theorem 4.1].
Next, to reduce to the VP bound in [10], define for uV ∈ RV+
λuV (B) =
{
ui
u(V ) i ∈ V,B ∈ {{i}, V \ {i}}
0 otherwise
Then,
α(λuV ) = min
e∈E′
∑
B 6⊇A:ξ(e)⊆B
λuV (B)
≥ min
e∈E′
∑
i∈ξ(e)|x(e)⊆V \{i}
ui
u(V )
= min
e∈E′
∑
i∈V \ξ(e)
ui
u(V )
= 1−max
e∈E′
u(ξ(e))
u(V )
Applying the above to (44) In particular, with uV chosen to
be the solution to
τ = max
uV ∈RV+ :u(ξ(e))≤1,∀e∈E
u(V ),
we have
α(λuV ) ≥ 1−max
e∈E′
1
u(V )
= 1−
1
τ
.
Applying the above into (44) gives the VP bound [10, Theo-
rem 4.3].
V. CHALLENGES
For hypergraphical sources, it is plausible that the upper
bound (12) of CS(rV ) in Theorem 1 may also tight. In
this work, we have only shown that the corresponding upper
bound (15b) of CS(R) in Corollary 2 under total discussion
rate constraint instead of individual rate constraints is tight.
If we consider more general sources beyond the hypergraph-
ical sources, however, the bound (15b) on CS(R) may be
loose. In this section, we give an example of a finite linear
source where the bound (20) on RS is loose, and so is (15b).
Nevertheless, it remains plausible that compressed secret key
agreement and linear network coding is optimal for general
finite linear sources.
Consider A = V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
Z1 = Xa
Z2 = Xb
Z3 = Xc
Z4 = (Xa,Xb,Xd)
Z5 = (Xa,Xb,Xc ⊕ Xd)
(49)
where Xa,Xb,Xc,Xd are uniformly random and independent
bits, and ⊕ denotes the XOR or binary addition operation.
Proposition 7 RS = 3 > 2 ≥ ρ(CS) for (49) and so the
bound (20) on the communication complexity is loose. ✷
PROOF It was shown in [19] that CS = 1 and RS = RCO = 3.
It remains to show that the lower bound (20) is at most 2, i.e.,
inf
W:I(W∧ZV )−ρ(W)≥CS
I(W ∧ ZV )− CS ≥ 2
To do so, it suffices to show that a feasible solution W to the
L.H.S. is
W = (Xa,Xb,Xc)
because then the bound is at most
I(ZV ∧W) − CS = H(Xa,Xb,Xc)− 1 = 2
as desired.
It remains to show the feasibility, i.e., the following con-
straint holds,
I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W) ≥ CS.
Note that I(W ∧ ZV ) = H(Xa,Xb,Xc) = 3, CS = 1, and
ρ(W) = minr′
V
:(13a) r
′(V ) by linear programming duality, it
suffices to show that
min
r′
V
:(13a)
r′(V ) ≤ 2.
In particular, we will argue that a feasible solution with
r′(V ) ≤ 2 is
r′i =
{
1 i ∈ {4, 5}
0 i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
More precisely, we will argue that the constraint (13a) that
r′(B) ≥ I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ∀B ( V.
We can divide all the cases of B as follows:
8• 4 6∈ B and 5 6∈ B. Then,
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ≤ H(W|Z4,Z5) = 0
and so the constraint holds trivially as r′i ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ V .
• 4 6∈ B or 5 6∈ B but not both. Then,
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ≤ max{H(W|Z4), H(W|Z5)} = 1
r(B) ≥ min{r4, r5} = 1
Since and so the constraint holds.
• {4, 5} ⊆ B but 1 6∈ B or 2 6∈ B or 3 6∈ B. Then,
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) ≤ max
i∈{1,2,3}
H(W|Zi) ≤ 2
r(B) ≥ r4 + r5 = 2
and so the constraint holds.
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first derive (12b) from (12a). By the linear programming
duality, we can rewrite (12a) as
max
W
min
λ,µV
I(W ∧ ZV )
−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) +
∑
i∈V
µiri
(50)
(51)
where λ : {B ⊆ V | B 6⊇ A} → R+ and µV ∈ RV+ are
subject to the constraint∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
λ(B) − µi = 1 ∀i ∈ V.
The above constraint holds if and only if
λ ∈ Λ¯
µi =
∑
B⊇A:i∈B
λ(B)− 1,
(52)
(53)
which implies∑
i∈V
µiri =
∑
i∈V
∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
[λ(B)− 1]ri
=
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)r(B) − r(V ). (54)
Substituting (54) into (51) gives (12b), and we need only
impose (52) but not (53) as (12b) does not depend on µV .
To prove (12a), we first consider the case without ran-
domization. More precisely, let CNRS (rV ) be the secrecy
capacity (6) but with no randomiziation, i.e., with (1) replaced
by UV = 0. We want to the that C
NR
S (rV ) is bounded by (12a).
For i ∈ V , let
r′i :=
1
n
∑
1≤j≤r:ij=i
H(F˜j |F˜
j−1).
It follows that
r′i ≤
1
n
∑
1≤j≤r:ij=i
H(F˜j |(F˜j′ | j
′ ≤ j, ij′ = i))
=
1
n
H(Fi)
r′i ≤ ri + δn, (55)
where the first inequality is because conditioning reduces
entropy; the last two steps are by (2b) and respectively (5b)
for some δn → 0 as n→ 0. Furthermore, for B ⊆ V ,
r′(B) ≥
1
n
∑
i∈B
∑
1≤j≤r:ij=i
H(F˜j | F˜
j−1,ZnV \B)
=
1
n
∑
i∈V
∑
1≤j≤r:ij=i
H(F˜j | F˜
j−1,ZnV \B)
=
1
n
H(F | ZnV \B) (56)
where the first inequality is again because conditioning reduces
entropy; the second equality is because the terms in the
summation is 0 for i ∈ V \B by the definition (2a) of F˜j . For
B = V , the first inequality holds with equality and so
r′(V ) =
1
n
H(F). (57)
Next, we single-letterize the key rate and discussion rate as
follows. Let
Wj := (K,F,Z
j−1
V ) (58)
and J be a random variable uniformly distributed over
{1, . . . , n} and independent of all other random variables. By
the secrecy constraint (4),
log|K| ≤ H(K | F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(K,F)−H(F)
+nδn
(a)
= I(K,F ∧ ZnV )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
n∑
j=1
I(K,F ∧ ZV j |Z
j−1
V )
(d)
=
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,Zj−1V︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Wj
∧ZV j)
(e)
=nI(WJ ∧ ZV J)
+
(b)
≤nδn︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(K,F|ZnV )−
(c)
=nr′(V )︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(F) +nδn
log|K|
n
= I(WJ ∧ ZV J)− r
′(V ) + 2δn (59)
for some δn → 0 as n → 0. (a) is because H(K,F) =
I(K,F ∧ ZnV ) + H(K,F|Z
n
V ). (b) is by the recoverability
constraint (3) and Fano’s inequality while (c) is by (57). (d)
is because I(Zj−1V ∧ZV j |K,F) = 0 by the memorylessness of
the random source ZV . (e) follows from the definition (58) of
Wj and J.
9Similarly, by (3) and Fano’s inequality,
H(F|ZnV \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(f)
≤nr′(B)
≥
=H(K,F)−I(K,F∧ZnV \B)︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(K,F | ZnV \B) −nδn
≥
(g)
=nI(WJ∧ZV J)︷ ︸︸ ︷
I(K,F ∧ ZnV )− I(K,F ∧ Z
n
V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,Zj−1
V \B ∧ ZV \B j)
≤
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,Zj−1V︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Wj
∧ZV \B j)
(h)
= nI(WJ ∧ ZV \B J)
−nδn.
r′(B) ≥ I(WJ ∧ ZV J)− I(WJ ∧ ZV \B J)− δn, (60)
for some δn → 0 as n → 0. (f) is by (56). (g) follows from
(e) while (h) follows from the same argument for (e). (60)
follows from (56).
Since (55), (59), and (60) holds for any secret agreement
scheme (K,F), we have the desired bound (12a) on CNRS (rV )
by setting n→∞ and noting that PZV J = PZV .
It remains to extend the bound (12a) to the general case with
randomization (1) where UV not necessarily deterministic. Let
Z′i := (Ui,Zi) for i ∈ V. (61)
We have
CS[ZV ](rV ) ≤ C
NR
S [Z
′
V ](rV )
because a secret key agreement scheme with randomization
for ZV is also a secret key agreement scheme with no
randomization but for Z′V . It suffices to show that the R.H.S.
is upper bounded by (12).
Applying the bound (12b) with the source Z′V instead of
ZV for the secrecy capacity with no randomization, we have
CNRS [Z
′
V ](rV ) ≤ max
W
min
λ∈Λ¯
I(W ∧ Z′V )− r(V )
−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)
[
I(W ∧ Z′B|Z
′
V \B)− r(B)
]
.
It suffices to show that the above bound is upper bounded by
(12b), i.e., the bound above remains valid after replacing Z′V
by ZV . In particular, we will show that
I(W ∧ Z′V )−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ Z′B|Z
′
V \B)
≤ I(W ∧ ZV )−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B).
(62)
Consider V = {1, . . . ,m} without loss of generality and
define
r˜i := I(W ∧ Ui|U
i−1,ZV ).
It follows that
r˜(B) =
∑
i∈B
I(W ∧ Ui|U
i−1ZV )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(Ui|U
i−1,ZV )−H(Ui|U
i−1,ZV ,W)
≤
∑
i∈B
=H(Ui|U
i−1,UV \B ,ZV )−H(Ui|U
i−1,UV \B,ZV ,W)︷ ︸︸ ︷
I(W ∧ Ui|U
i−1,UV \B,ZV )
= I(W ∧ UB|UV \B,ZV ) (63)
where the inequality holds with equality if B = V . This
is because H(Ui|Ui−1,ZV ) = H(Ui|Ui−1,UV \B,ZV ) by
the independence assumption (1), and H(Ui|Ui−1,ZV ,W) ≥
H(Ui|Ui−1,UV \B,ZV ,W) with equality if B = V . It follows
that
I(W ∧ Z′B|Z
′
V \B)
= I(W ∧ UB,ZB|UV \B,ZV \B)
= I(W ∧ ZB|UV \B,ZV \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= H(ZB|UV \B,ZV \B)−H(ZB|UV \B,ZV \B,W)
≥ H(ZB|ZV \B)−H(ZB|ZV \B,W) by (1)
= I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)
+
≥r˜(B) by (63)︷ ︸︸ ︷
I(W ∧ UB|UV \B,ZV )
≥ I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) + r˜(B). (64)
Again, the inequalities above holds with equality if B = V .
Applying (64) to the L.H.S. of (62) and subtract the result-
ing lower bound from the R.H.S. of (62), we have
L.H.S. of (62)− R.H.S. of (62)
≥
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)
∑
i∈B
r˜(B)− r˜(V )
=
∑
i∈V
∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1 by (14)
λ(B)r˜(B)− r˜(V )
≥ r˜(V )− r˜(V ) = 0,
which implies (62) as desired and therefore completes the
proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
We first derive the bound (16) on the unconstrained capacity
by (15b). By the definition 18 of Iλ,
Iλ(ZV )− Iλ(ZV |W)
= H(ZV )−
∑
B 6⊇A
H(ZB|ZV \B)
−H(ZV |W) +
∑
B 6⊇A
H(ZB|ZV \B,W)
= I(W ∧ ZV )−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B). (65)
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Hence, by (15b), for R ≥ 0,
CS(R) ≤ sup
W
I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W)
= sup
W
min
λ
H(ZV )−
∑
B 6⊇A
H(ZB|ZV \B)
≤ sup
W
min
λ
Iλ(ZV )− Iλ(ZV |W)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by Shearer Lemma (see (24))
≤ min
λ
Iλ(ZV )
which gives (16) as desired since the bound does not depend
on R.
Next, we derive the upper bounds (15a) and (15b) on CS(R)
from the upper bound (12) on CS(rV ) as follows: For R ≥ 0.
By (7),
CS(R) = sup{CS(rV )|r(V ) ≤ R}
(a)
≤ sup{I(W ∧ ZV )− r
′(V )|r(V ) ≤ R, (13)}
(b)
≤ sup{I(W ∧ ZV )− r
′(V )|r′(V ) ≤ R, (13b)}
(c)
=sup{I(W ∧ ZV )− min
r′
V
:(13b)
r′(V )| min
r′
V
:(13b)
r′(V ) ≤ R}
(d)
= sup{I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W)|ρ(W) ≤ R},
which gives (15b) as desired. (b) also gives (15a). (a) is by
(12). (b) is because (13b) and r(V ) ≤ R imply r′(V ) ≤ R. (c)
is because it is optimal to choose r′V to minimize r
′(V ). (d)
is by the linear programming duality and the definition (17)
of ρ(W).
Finally, we can derive the lower bound (20) on RS(rK) from
(15b) as follows: By (8),
RS(rK) = inf{R ≥ 0|CS(R) ≥ rK}
(e)
= inf{R ≥ 0|I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W) ≥ rK, ρ(W) ≤ R}
(f)
= inf{ρ(W)|I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W) ≥ rK}
(g)
= inf{ρ(W)|I(W′ ∧ ZV )− ρ(W
′) = rK}
= inf{I(W′ ∧ ZV )− rK|I(W
′ ∧ ZV )− ρ(W
′) = rK}
which implies (20) as desired. (e) is by (15b). (f) is obtained
by setting R = ρ(W) without loss of optimality. (g) is because,
for any feasible W to (f), we also have a feasible W′ to (g)
and vice versa. E.g., given W, one can choose
W′ =
{
(1,W) Y = 1
0 Y = 0
where Y is an indicator random variable independent of
(ZV ,W) with I(W
′ ∧ ZV ) = ǫ. Note that
I(W′ ∧ ZV ) = ǫI(W
′ ∧ ZV )
ρ(W′) = ǫρ(W)
and so the condition in (g) can be satisfied with some ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
as desired. This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we show that the upper bound (15b) on the
secrecy capacity is tight for hypergraphical sources. Indeed, we
show that the lower bound (20) on communication complexity
is tight by showing that the following sufficient condition for
tightness holds for hypergraphical sources.
Lemma 1 The lower bound (20) on communication is tight
for all rK ∈ [0, CS] if there exists an optimal solution W to
(20) in the form
W = (Q,Z′V ) such that
I(Q ∧ ZV ) = 0
H(Z′i|Zi,Q) = 0 ∀i ∈ V
H(Z′B|Z
′
V \B,Q) = H(Z
′
B|ZV \B,Q) ∀B 6⊇ A.
(66a)
(66b)
(66c)
(66d)
Furthermore, compressed secret key agreement [21] is optimal
in achieving RS(rK) and therefore CS(R) (15b) for R ≥ 0.✷
PROOF Consider any optimal solution W to (20) satisfying
the condition (66). We will show that
I(W ∧ ZV \B) = H(Z
′
V \B |Q) ∀B ⊆ V. (67)
Then, the lower bound (20) can be written as
I(W ∧ ZV )− ρK
(a)
≥ ρ(W)
(b)
=max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)
(c)
=H(Z′V |Q)−min
λ∈Λ
Iλ(Z
′
V |Q)
(d)
≥RS(rK)
which is the desired reverse inequality of the bound (20).
(a) follows from the constraint on W in (20). (b) is by the
definition (17) of ρ(W). (c) is obtained by rewriting
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) = I(W ∧ ZV )− I(W ∧ ZV \B)
= H(Z′V |Q)−H(Z
′
V \B|Q)
= H(Z′B|Z
′
V \B,Q)∑
B⊇A
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) = H(Z
′
V |Q)− Iλ(Z
′
V |Q)
where the second equality is by (67) and the last equality is
by the definition (18) of Iλ. (d) is because the R.H.S. of (c)
is the discussion rate achievable by the compressed secret key
agreement scheme in [21, Theorem 3]1 to attain a key rate of
min
λ∈Λ
Iλ(Z
′
V |Q) ≥ H(Z
′
V |Q)− I(W ∧ ZV ) + ρK = ρK.
where the first inequality is by (c) and the second equality is
by (67).
It remains to show (67) as follows. For B ⊆ V ,
I(W ∧ ZV \B) = I(Z
′
V ,Q ∧ ZV \B) by (66a)
= I(Z′V ∧ ZV \B |Q) + I(Q ∧ ZV \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (66b)
= I(Z′V \B ∧ ZV \B |Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(ZV \B |Q)
+ I(Z′B ∧ ZV \B|Q,Z
′
V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
1The extension to the case with helpers is straightforward as in [5, 33].
11
as desired where the last equality is because
I(Z′B ∧ ZV \B|Q,Z
′
V \B)
= H(Z′B|Q,Z
′
V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(Z′
B
|Q,ZV \B) by (66d)
−H(Z′B|Q,Z
′
V \B ,ZV \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(Z′
B
|Q,ZV \B) by (66c)
This completes the proof. 
Note that W defined in (27) satisfies (66) with Z′i defined
as in (31). In particular,
H(Z′B|ZV \B ,Q) = H(Z
′
B|Z
′
V \B,Q) = H(X
′
E(B)|Q) (68)
where E(B) is defined in (30) as the set of edges that are
incident only on nodes within B. By the above lemma, it
suffices to show that W defined in (27) is an optimal solution
to the lower bound (20).
For simplicity, we rewrite the lower bound (20) as H(ZV )−
rK − T where
T := max{H(ZV |W)|I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W) ≥ rK}. (69)
Since the above maximization share the same set of solutions
W as that of the lower bound (20), it suffices to show that W
defined in (27) is optimal to the above maximization.
We further rewrite T without changing the set of optimal
W below:
T
(a)
=max{H(ZV |W)|Iλ(ZV )− Iλ(ZV |W) ≥ rK ∀λ ∈ Λ}
(b)
=max{H(ZV |W)|∑
B 6⊇Aλ(B)H(ZV \B|W) ≤ Iλ(ZV )− rK
+
(∑
B 6⊇A λ(B) − 1
)
H(ZV |W)∀λ ∈ Λ
}
(c)
=max{H(ZV |W)|∑
B 6⊇Aλ(B)H(ZV \B|W) ≤ α(λ)∀λ ∈ Λ}
(d)
=max{H(XE |W)|
trivial︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 ≤ H(Xe|W) ≤ H(Xe)∀e ∈ E,∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)H(XE(V \B)|W) ≤ α(λ)∀λ ∈ Λ}
where E(·) is defined in (30), and
α(λ) := Iλ(ZV )− rK +
(∑
B 6⊇A λ(B)− 1
)
T. (70)
• (a) is obtained by rewriting the constraint in (69) as
rK ≤ Iλ(ZV )− Iλ(ZV |W) ∀λ ∈ Λ,
because
I(W ∧ ZV )− ρ(W)
= min
λ∈Λ
I(W ∧ ZV )−
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Iλ(ZV )−Iλ(ZV |W) by (65)
.
• (b) is obtained by expanding Iλ(ZV |W) by its defini-
tion (18).
• ≤ for (c) is because any optimal solution W to (b)
is feasible to (c). To explain ≥ for (c), suppose to
the contrary that there exists a solution W to (c) with
H(ZV |W) > T . Then, that solution is also feasible to (b)
because the constraint of (c) with T < H(ZV |W) implies
the constraint in (b), which is the desired contradiction
since the maximum in (b) equals T .
• (d) is because ZV \B = XE(V \B). Note that the additional
constraints in (d) but not (c) hold trivially as the edge
variables have bounded supports.
It remains to argue that W defined in (27) is an optimal
solution to (d). More precisely, we show that this choice of
W achieves the maximum given by the linear program
T ′ := max{y(E) | 0 ≤ ye ≤ H(Xe)∀e ∈ E∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)y(E(V \B)) ≤ α(λ)∀λ ∈ Λ}
(71a)
(71b)
where y(E′) :=
∑
e∈E′ ye for E
′ ⊆ E as usual.
• To show T ≤ T ′, consider the dual of the linear program
in (e), i.e.,
T ′ = min
µ:E∩Λ→R+
∑
e∈E
µ(e)H(Xe) +
∑
λ∈Λ
µ(λ)α(λ) such that
µ(e) +
∑
λ∈Λ
µ(λ)
∑
B 6⊇A:e∈E(B)
λ(B) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E. (72)
For any optimal solution µ, since H(XE′ |W) is submod-
ular in E′ ⊆ E, i.e.,
H(XE1 |W) +H(XE2 |W)
≥ H(XE1∩E2 |W) +H(XE1∪E2 |W) ∀E1, E2 ⊆ E,
we have by Edmonds’ greedy algorithm (see [10,
Lemma A.1]) that, for any solution W to (d),
T = H(XE |W) ≤
∑
e∈E
µ(e)H(Xe|W)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤H(Xe)
+
∑
λ∈Λ
µ(λ)
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)H(XE(B)|W)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤α(λ) by (71)
≤ T ′ as desired by (71b).
• To show T ≥ T ′, consider any optimal solution yE
to (71) and define W by (27) with
xe := H(Xe)− ye ∀e ∈ E. (73)
The above definition of W is valid because (71a) implies
xe/H(Xe) ∈ [0, 1], which is a valid probability PQe in
(27c). For E′ ⊆ E,
H(XE′ |W) = H(XE′ |QE ,X
′
E)
=
∑
e∈E′
H(Xe|Qe,X
′
e)
=
∑
e∈E′
H(Xe|Qe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(Xe)
−H(X′e|Qe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=xe
= y(E′).
(74)
The first equality is by (27a) that W = (QE ,X
′
E). The
second equality is by the independence of (Qe,X
′
e,Xe)
for e ∈ E, which follows from (27b) and (27c). The third
equality is by the fact that H(X′e|Xe,Qe) = 0 by (27b).
The last equality is by the definition (73) of ye.
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It follows that the constraint in (d) holds, i.e., for all
λ ∈ Λ, ∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B) H(XE(V \B)|W)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=y(E(V \B)) by (74)
≤ α(λ)
by (71b). By the feasibility of W to (d),
T ≥ H(XE |W) = y(E) = T
′
as desired. The first equality is by (74) and the last is by
the optimality of yE to (71).
This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Corollary 2
With the definition (11) of W and the definition (31) of Z′V ,
we have
I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B) = I(W ∧ ZV )− I(W ∧ ZV \B)
(a)
=H(Z′V |Q)−H(Z
′
V \B |Q)
= H(Z′B|Z
′
V \B ,Q)
(b)
=H(X′E(B)|Q)
(c)
=
∑
e∈E(B)
H(X′e|Q)
(d)
= x(E(B))
(75)
where (a) is by (67), (b) is by (68), (c) is by (27b), and (d)
is by (27c).
Applying the above equality to the capacity upper
bound (15a) and (15b) gives (28a) and (28b) respectively.
Similarly, (29) follows from (20).
By the ellipsoid method [31], to show that the linear
programs are polynomial-time solvable, it suffices to show that
the following separation oracle for (28a) is.
0 ≤ max{R− r(V ),
min
e∈E
xe,
min
e∈E
H(Xe)− xe,
min
i∈A
min
B⊆V \{i}
r(B) − x(E(B))}.
In particular, in the last expression, mini∈AminB⊆V \{i} is
equivalent to minB⊆V :B 6⊇A. It is straightforward to verify that
the above inequality holds if and only if (rV , xE) is a feasible
solution to (28). It suffices to show that the last minimization
min
B⊆V \{i}
r(B) − x(E(B)) (76)
is polynomial-time solvable despite having exponentially many
constraints. To argue this, note that by (75)
r(B) − x(E(B)) =
∑
i∈B
ri −H(Z
′
V |Q)−H(Z
′
V \B|Q),
(77)
which is submodular in B by the submodularity of en-
tropy [41]. Hence, (76) is a submodular function minimization
over a lattice family, namely the boolean lattice, which is
known to be strongly polynomial-time solvable [42]. This
completes the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider S ⊆ V : |A \ S| ≥ 2 and fractional partition
λ′ : {B ⊆ V \ S : B 6⊇ A \ S} → R+ of V \ S as stated
in the proposition. To prove the necessary condition (41) for
CS(rV ) ≥ rK and rV ∈ R
V
+ , it suffices to show the following
upper bound
CS(rV ) ≤ Iλ′(ZV \S) + (∆− 1)r(S) where
∆ :=
∑
B 6⊇A\S
λ′(B).
(78a)
(78b)
In particular, we will show that the above bound is given by
the upper bound (12b) with λ ∈ Λ¯ defined in terms of λ′ as
follows:
λ(B) =
{
λ′(B \ S) B ⊆ V : B ⊇ S
0 otherwise.
(79)
λ ∈ barΛ, i.e., (14) holds, because
∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
λ(B)− 1 =
{∑
B 6⊇A\S:i∈B λ
′(B)− 1 i ∈ V \ S∑
B 6⊇A\S λ
′(B)− 1 otherwise.
=
{
0 i ∈ V \ S, by (42)
∆− 1 otherwise, by (78b)
≥ 0.
(80)
The last inequality is because, for any i ∈ V \ S, we have
∆ ≥
∑
B 6⊇A\S:i∈B λ(B) = 1.
Note that the upper bound (12b) remains a valid upper
bound for any given choice of λ, i.e.,
CS(rV ) ≤
1,︷ ︸︸ ︷
I(W ∧ ZV )−
2,︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)
+

∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)r(B) − r(V )


︸ ︷︷ ︸
3,
.
With the choice of λ given by (79),
3,=
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)
∑
i∈B
λ(B)ri
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∑
i∈V
∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B λ(B)ri
−
∑
i∈V
ri
=
∑
i∈V
ri

 ∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
λ(B) − 1


= (∆− 1)r(S).
where the last equality is by (80).
2,=
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \B)
=
∑
B 6⊇A\S
λ′(B) I(W ∧ ZB∪S|ZV \(B∪S))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(W∧ZB |ZV \S\B)+I(W∧ZS|ZV \S)
= ∆I(W ∧ ZS |ZV \S) +
∑
B 6⊇A\S
λ′(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \S\B),
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where the last equality is again by (80).
1,− 2,= I(W ∧ ZV )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(W∧ZV \S)+I(W∧ZS|ZV \S)
+ 2,
=
≥0 ∵∆≥1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−∆− 1)I(W ∧ ZS |ZV \S)
+ I(W ∧ ZV \S)−
∑
B 6⊇A\S
λ′(B)I(W ∧ ZB|ZV \S\B)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Iλ′ (ZV \S)−Iλ′(ZV \S|W) by (65)
≤ Iλ′ (ZV \S)− Iλ′ (ZV \S |W)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by Shearer Lemma (see (24)).
Hence, 1,− 2,+ 3, can be upper bounded by (78), which
completes the proof.
F. Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the characterization (28b) of CS(R). It is optimal
to set
xe = H(Xe) ∀e ∈ E \ E
′
because ρ does not depend on the above xe’s as ξ(e) ⊇ A for
e ∈ E \ E′. (28b) can be rewritten as
CS(R)−H(XE\E′) = max{x(E
′)− ρ|ρ ≤ R
ρ = max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B))
0 ≤ xe ≤ H(Xe) ∀e ∈ E
′}.
(81a)
(81b)
(81c)
The above maximization is at least 0, for instance, by choosing
xe = 0 for all e ∈ E′. This implies the first inequality in (44)
as desired. It remains to show the second inequality.
Consider the case H(XE′) = 0 and so α = 1 by defi-
nition (70). Then, in (28b), we must have x(E′) = ρ = 0
because x(E(B)) ≤ x(E′) ≤ H(XE′) = 0 for all B ⊆ V .
Hence, the maximum in (81) is 0, which implies (44) as
desired since α = 1 by the definition (70).
Consider the remaining case H(XE′) 6= 0 and any optimal
solution xE′ and ρ to (81) such that ρ > 0. To show that the
choice of optimal solution is possible, note that any feasible
solution satisfies
x(E′) ≥
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B)) ∀xE′ ∈ R
E′
+ , λ ∈ Λ (82)
by the Shearer Lemma. (See (24) and (77).) Suppose to the
contrary that any optimal solution must have ρ = 0. By (81b),
we must have xe = 0 for all e ∈ E′ which implies x(E′) −
ρ = 0. This is a contradiction because it is possible to choose
xe > 0 for some e ∈ E′ as H(XE′) 6= 0, and such choice is
also optimal as x(E′)− ρ ≥ 0 by (82).
Next, with the optimal solution xE′ and ρ > 0, (81)
becomes
CS(R)−H(XE\E′) ≤ x(E
′)− ρ
=
[
1
ρ/x(E′)
− 1
]
ρ
(a)
≤
[
1
ρ/x(E′)
− 1
]
R
with equality if ρ = R. It suffices to show ρ
x(E′) ≥ α(λ),
which gives the second inequality in (81). By (81b),
ρ
x(E′)
= max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)
x(E(B))
x(E′)
= max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)p(E(B))
where the last equality is obtained by setting
p(e) =
xe
x(E′)
∀e ∈ E′
p(E′′) =
∑
e∈E′′
p(e) ∀E′′ ⊆ E′.
(83)
Note that p is a probability distribution over E′ since p(E′) =
1 and p(e) ∈ [0, 1] for e ∈ E′ by (81c). Let P(E′) be the set
of all possible distributions over E′. Then,
ρ
x(E′)
(b)
≥ min
Pe∈P(E′)
max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)E[1{ξ(e) ⊆ B}]
(c)
=max
λ∈Λ
min
Pe∈P(E′)
E

 ∑
B 6⊇A:ξ(e)⊆B
λ(B)


(d)
=max
λ∈Λ
max
e∈E′
∑
B 6⊇A:ξ(e)⊆B
λ(B)
= max
λ∈Λ
α(λ)
which, together with (a), gives (81) as desired. In (b),
1{ξ(e) ⊆ B} corresponds to the indicator random variable
that is equal to 1 if and only if the event ξ(e) ⊆ B happens,
and so the expectation is Pe(E(B)) by the definition (30)
of E(B). The inequality (b) holds with equality if Pe = p
defined in (83) in terms of xE′ is an optimal solution. (c)
is by the minimax theorem, since the objective function is
linear in both Pe and λ over compact convex sets P(E
′) and
Λ respectively. (d) is because the expectation over e is no
smaller than the minimum over e ∈ E′. The last equality is
by the definition (70) of α(λ).
Finally, consider proving the equality condition. If R = 0,
the inequalities in (44) holds with equality trivially. Similarly,
if α(λ) ≥ 1, then 1
α(λ) − 1 ≤ 0 and so the inequalities in (44)
must hold with equality. Consider the remaining case
α(λ) < 1∀λ ∈ Λ
H(Xe) > R > 0 ∀e ∈ E
′.
(84)
(85)
We first argue that the constraint xe ≤ H(Xe) in (81b) can be
removed without changing the maximization in (81), i.e.,
CS(R)−H(XE\E′) = max{x(E
′)− ρ|ρ ≤ R
ρ = max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B))
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
′}.
(86)
which differs from (81) in the last constraint. Suppose to the
contrary that one can have a feasible solution to the above with
14
xe′ > H(Xe′ ) for some e
′ ∈ E′. Then, with for some partition
{B1, B2} of V \ ξ(e
′) such that Bi 6⊇ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, define
λ′(B) =
{
1 B = ξ(e′), B1, B2
0 otherwise
which is a fraction partition in Λ. It follows from the definition
of ρ and the constraint xe ≥ 0 that
ρ ≥ λ′(ξ(e′))xe′ ≥ H(Xe′ ) > R
which is the desired contradiction.
Next, we argue that the constraint ρ ≤ R in (86) must be
tight for the optimal solution. Suppose to the contrary that the
constraint is slack. Then, (86) simplifies to
CS(R)−H(XE\E′) = max
xE′∈R
E′
+
x(E′)
−max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B))
> 0,
(87)
where the last inequality is because
1 > max
λ∈Λ
α(λ)
= min
Pe∈P(E′)
max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)E[1{ξ(e) ⊆ B}]
= min
xE′∈R
E′
+
max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)
x(E(B))
x(E′)
,
where the first is by (eq:LB:eq1), the second equality is by (c)
and (d), and the last equality is by rewriting Pe = p defined
in (83). Now, given any feasible solution xE′ to (87), 2xE′ is
a strictly better solution, and so the maximum in (87) must
be unbounded, contradicting the fact that (81) is bounded by
H(XE′).
Altogether, for any optimal solution xE′ and ρ = R > 0,
(a) holds with equality as ρ = R, and
ρ
x(E′)
= min
xE′∈R
|E′|
+
max
λ∈Λ
∑
B 6⊇A
λ(B)x(E(B))
= max
λ∈Λ
α(λ),
i.e., (b) also holds with equality. This completes the proof.
G. Proof of Proposition 6
The first inequality in (47) follows immediately from (44)
with any R > 0. Equality holds trivially if E′ ∈ E(C1) ∪
E(C2) for some bipartition {C1, C2} such that Ci ∩ A 6= ∅
for all i ∈ {1, 2}. This is because one can show that
maxλ∈Λ α(λ) = 1 with λ(B) = 1 for B = V \Ci, i ∈ {1, 2},
and λ(B) = 0 otherwise.
To show the second inequality, let
λ′(B) =
1
|A|
1{∃j ∈ A,B = V \ {j}}
+
1
|A|(|A| − 1)
1{∃j ∈ A,B = V \ {j}}
for B ⊆ V : B 6⊇ A. Then, λ′ ∈ Λ because, for i ∈ V ,
∑
B 6⊇A:i∈B
λ′(B) =
1
|A|
1,︷ ︸︸ ︷
|{V \ {j} | j ∈ A \ {i}}|
+
1
|A|(|A| − 1)
|{A \ {j} | j ∈ A \ {i}}|︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
=


|A|−1
|A| +
1
|A| i ∈ A ∵ 1,= 2,
= |A| − 1
|A|
|A| +
0
|A| i ∈ V \A ∵ 1,= |A|,
2,= 0
= 1.
By (70),
α(λ′) = min
e∈E′
∑
B 6⊇A:ξ(e)⊆B
λ′(B)
= min
e∈E′
1
|A|
3,︷ ︸︸ ︷
|{V \ {j} | ξ(e) ⊆ V \ {j}}|
+
1
|A|(|A| − 1)
|{A \ {j} | j ∈ A, ξ(e) ⊆ A \ {i}}|︸ ︷︷ ︸
4,
• Consider the case V \A = ∅′. Then,
3,= 4,= |A \ ξ(e)|
and so
α(λ′) = min
e∈E′
|A \ ξ(e)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥|A|−d
= 1
|A|−1︷ ︸︸ ︷[
1
|A|
+
1
|A|(|A| − 1)
]
≥
|A| − d
|A| − 1
• Consider the remaining case V \A 6= ∅. Then,
3,= |A \ ξ(e)|
4,=
{
|A \ ξ(e)| ξ(e) ⊆ A
0 otherwise.
Thus,
α(λ′) = min
e∈E′
|A \ ξ(e)|
[
1
|A|
+
1{ξ(e) ⊆ A}
|A|(|A| − 1)
]
= min
e∈E′
{
|A\ξ(e)|
|A|−1 ξ(e) ⊆ A
|A\ξ(e)|
|A| otherwise.
≥
{
max{|A|−d,1}
|A|−1 ξ(e) ⊆ A
max{|A|−d+1,1}
|A| otherwise.
=
{
max{|A|−d,1}
|A|−1 d < |A|
max{|A|−d+1,1}
|A| otherwise.
=
{
|A|−d
|A|−1 d < |A|
1
|A| otherwise.
Combining the two cases above, we have
α(λ′) ≥
{
1
|A| d ≥ |A|, V \A 6= ∅
|A|−d
|A|−1 otherwise.
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Hence,
1
maxλ∈Λ α(λ)
− 1 ≤
1
α(λ′)
− 1
≤
{
|A| − 1 d ≥ |A|, V \A 6= ∅
d−1
|A|−d otherwise,
which can be shown to simplify to the second inequality in
(47) as desired. For a complete d-uniform hypergraph, all
the above inequalities can be satisfied with equality, and so
equality can also hold for the second inequality in (47).
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